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The impossibility of “fairness”: a generalized impossibility result
for decisions
Thomas Miconi
Abstract
Various measures can be used to estimate bias or un-
fairness in a predictor. Previous work has already
established that some of these measures are incom-
patible with each other. Here we show that, when
groups differ in prevalence of the predicted event, sev-
eral intuitive, reasonable measures of fairness (proba-
bility of positive prediction given occurrence or non-
occurrence; probability of occurrence given predic-
tion or non-prediction; and ratio of predictions over
occurrences for each group) are all mutually exclu-
sive: if one of them is equal among groups, the other
two must differ. The only exceptions are for perfect,
or trivial (always-positive or always-negative) predic-
tors. As a consequence, any non-perfect, non-trivial
predictor must necessarily be “unfair” under two out
of three reasonable sets of criteria. This result readily
generalizes to a wide range of well-known statistical
quantities (sensitivity, specificity, false positive rate,
precision, etc.), all of which can be divided into three
mutually exclusive groups. Importantly, The results
applies to all predictors, whether algorithmic or hu-
man. We conclude with possible ways to handle this
effect when assessing and designing prediction meth-
ods.
1 Introduction
Suppose we must make predictions about the occur-
rence of a certain event, or condition, when the preva-
lence of this condition differs among different popu-
lation groups. Ideally, we would want our predictions
to be free of bias or prejudice. But what does it mean
for a prediction to be “unbiased”? Simply equalizing
the rate of positive predictions among groups is un-
satisfactory, if the groups do differ in actual preva-
lence for the condition. We want our predictions to
reflect the different base rates across groups, but not
to unjustly flag people due to their group member-
ship.
Several criteria can be used to determine whether a
predictor is biased, by comparing them across groups
(in the following, Y is a binary variable indicating
whether a certain event of interest actually occurs in
reality, Pred is a binary variable indicating that the
event is predicted to occur by the predictor):
• Equal probability of positive prediction,
given actual occurrence (or non-occurrence):
P (Pred/Y ) and P (Pred/¬Y ) (Measure 1)
• Equal probability of actual occurrence, given
positive (or negative) prediction: P (Y/Pred)
and P (Y/¬Pred) (Measure 2)
• Equal ratio between the number of predicted and
actual occurrences: P (Pred)/P (Y ) (Measure 3)
These conditions have been given different names
in the literature. The first one is known as “equalized
odds” [4]. The second one refers to equal predictive
value, and has also been called “predictive parity”.
We choose to call the third one “equal calibration”1.
These quantities provide intuitive measures of bias
because if they differ significantly between groups, we
1Here we use “calibration” to denote the overall ratio be-
tween the number of positive predictions and the number of
actual occurrences in the entire group. This is different from
[5], who use the term “calibration” (within each score bin) to
refer to our Measure 2, i.e. predictive parity.
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might suspect that the predictor is biased. To illus-
trate with examples from criminal justice, if actually-
guilty defendants from group A have a lower chance
of eliciting a positive prediction of guilt than actually-
guilty members of group B, we would suspect that the
predictor is biased in favour of group A. Conversely,
if defendants from group A that are predicted to be
guilty have a much lower chance of being actually
guilty than similarly-predicted members of group B,
we would suspect that the predictor is biased against
group A.
The third measure is perhaps the most intuitive:
suppose that 30% of group A are guilty, but 40%
test positive; while 20% of group B are guilty, but
only 10% of them test positive. The obvious differ-
ence in the severity of the test across groups (i.e. the
P (Pred)/P (Y ) ratio) might be regarded as prima fa-
cie evidence of bias.
Ideally, we would want all of these measures to
be simultaneously equal across groups. And indeed,
if our predictions were absolutely perfect, with zero
errors (i.e. P (Y/Pred) = P (Pred/Y ) = 1 and
P (Y/¬Pred) = P (Pred/¬Y ) = 0, for all groups),
this would actually be the case: all these measures
would be strictly equal across all groups, indepen-
dent of each group’s prevalence for the condition2
Unfortunately, for non-perfect predictors, when
prevalence differs among groups, some of these mea-
sures are known to be incompatible. Kleinberg, Mul-
lainathan and Raghavan [5], as well as Chouldechova
[3], showed that equalizing Measure 2 and Measure 1
among groups simultaneously was impossible.
The purpose of this note is to show that, for non-
perfect predictors and under different prevalences
among groups, all three of these criteria for fairness
are mutually exclusive. That is, unless the predictor
is infallible or trivial, equalizing one of these three
criteria across groups guarantees that both other cri-
teria will differ across groups. Furthermore, this re-
sult generalizes to a broad range of well-known sta-
tistical measures, which can be shown to fall within
three mutually exclusive sets.
2Incidentally, checking whether a proposed measure of fair-
ness is met by a perfect predictor is a useful, if weak, criterion
for judging such measures; note that equal prediction rates
across groups fails to meet it.
2 Proofs
The proofs are surprisingly simple, requiring nothing
more than the basic axioms of probability and Bayes’
Theorem.
We assume that P (Y ) differs among groups, and
that the predictor Pred is neither infallible (false
positives and false negative both occur), nor trivial
(always-positive or always-negative).
Suppose P (Pred/Y ) and P (Pred/¬Y ) are equal
among groups (Measure 1). What can we say about
P (Pred)/P (Y ) (Measure 3)?
P (Pred)/P (Y ) =
P (Pred ∩ Y ) + P (Pred ∩ ¬Y )
P (Y )
=
P (Pred/Y )P (Y )
P (Y )
+
P (Pred/¬Y )P (¬Y )
P (Y )
= P (Pred/Y ) + P (Pred/¬Y )
P (¬Y )
P (Y )
(1)
P (¬Y )
P (Y ) is a strictly monotonic (decreasing) function
of P (Y ). Therefore, if P (Pred/Y ) and P (Pred/¬Y )
are equal across groups, and P (Y ) differs across
groups, then expression 1 will differ across groups -
unless P (Pred/¬Y ) is 0, which would imply no false
positives, contradicting our assumptions. Therefore,
equalizing Measure 1 forces a difference in Measure 3
(and, by simple contraposition, vice versa).
From Bayes’ theorem, identical non-zero
P (Pred/Y ) and different P (Pred)/P (Y ) imme-
diately implies different P (Y/Pred). Therefore,
equalizing Measure 1 also forces a difference in
Measure 2.
From the same reasoning that led to expres-
sion 1, simply by swapping symbols, we obtain
that if P (Y/Pred) and P (Y/¬Pred) are equal
among groups (Measure 2), then P (Y )/P (Pred) is
a strictly decreasing function of P (Pred). Now if
P (Y )/P (Pred) were equal among groups, since P (Y )
differs among groups, then P (Pred) would also need
to differ among groups - and thus P (Y )/P (Pred)
(as a strictly monotonic function of P (Pred)) would
also differ among groups, leading to a contradiction.
Thus, equalizing Measure 2 forces a difference in Mea-
sure 3, and again vice versa from contraposition.
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Again, from Bayes’ theorem, identical P (Y/Pred)
and different P (Y )/P (Pred) immediately implies dif-
ferent P (Pred/Y ). Thus, equalizing Measure 2 forces
a difference in Measure 1.
Collectively, these proofs substantiate the argu-
ment of this paper: equalizing any of these three
criteria among groups forces both other criteria to
differ among groups.
By following the same methods, we can prove that
equalizing both components of Measure 1 forces a dif-
ference in both components of Measure 2, and vice
versa. However, this extension does not apply to
Measure 3: equalizing Measure 3 only ensures that
at least one component of either Measure 2 or Mea-
sure 1 will differ among groups, as shown above.
3 Application to COMPAS
data
A recent study of the COMPAS recidivism prediction
system [1] has generated a spike of interest in the
fairness of prediction algorithms. Among other argu-
ments, the authors pointed out that the algorithm
produced a much more false positives, and much
fewer false negatives, for Blacks than for Whites. The
makers of the COMPAS system replied that the al-
gorithm produced equal predictive value (probability
of recidivism, given a positive or negative prediction)
across races [2]. Several authors have already pointed
out that this discrepancy was unavoidable [3, 5], as
also shown in the present note.
What was less commonly reported, however, is an-
other discrepancy in the COMPAS data: Blacks were
more likely to elicit positive predictions, in proportion
to their actual rate of recidivism - that is, the al-
gorithm was differently calibrated (or “harsher”) for
Blacks than for whites. Specifically (using the data
published by ProPublica), 1901 out of 3695 Blacks
reoffended (51.4%) while 2174 out of 3695 were clas-
sified as “high risk” (58.8%); whereas 966 out of 2454
Whites reoffended (39.3%), but only 854 out of 2454
were classified as “high risk” (34.8%). Thus, Whites
were more likely to reoffend than predicted by the
White rate of high-risk classification (p < 10−5),
whereas Blacks were significantly less likely to re-
offend than predicted by the Black rate of high-risk
classification (p < 10−5).
This is exactly what the results above predict:
because predictive value (probability of occurrence
given positive or negative prediction) was roughly
equalized across the groups, and because one group
had higher prevalence of actual recidivism, calibra-
tion must necessarily differ.
4 Generalization
We note that the results above can immediately be
extended to a larger set of well-known statistical
quantities. In particular, note that the components
of our Measure 2, P (Y/Pred) and P (Y/¬Pred), are
equal to the precision, (also known as the predictive
positive value) and the false omission rate, respec-
tively. However, precision is exactly one minus the
false discovery rate (P (Y/Pred) = 1−P (¬Y/Pred));
similarly, the false omission rate equal one minus
the negative predictive value (P (Y/¬Pred) = 1 −
P (¬Y/¬Pred)). Thus, equality or difference in our
Measure 2 also extends to these additional quantities
(since equal or different x obviously forces equal or
different values of 1− x).
Similarly, the components of our Measure 1,
P (Pred/Y ) and P (Pred/¬Y ), are equal to the sen-
sitivity (also known as recall, or true positive rate)
and the false positive rate, respectively. However,
sensitivity is one minus the false discovery rate:
P (Pred/Y ) = 1 − P (¬Pred/Y ), and the false posi-
tive rate is one minus the specificity: P (Pred/¬Y ) =
1− P (¬Pred/¬Y ).
As a result, the measures described above can ac-
tually be divided into three mutually exclusive sets,
such that equalizing one set across groups guarantees
that at least some components of both other sets will
be unequal among groups. These sets of measures
are summarized in Table 1
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Expressions Names
Set 1 P (Y/Pred), P (Y/¬Pred), P (¬Y/Pred),
P (¬Y/¬Pred)
Precision (=Predictive Positive Value), False
Omission Rate, False Discovery Rate, Nega-
tive Predictive Value
Set 2 P (Pred/Y ), P (Pred/¬Y ), P (¬Pred/Y ),
P (¬Pred/¬Y )
Sensitivity (=Recall, True Positive Rate),
False Positive Rate (=Fallout), False Nega-
tive Rate, Specificity
Set 3 P (Pred)/P (Y ) Calibration (=Severity, Harshness Ratio)
Table 1: Three mutually exclusive sets of statistical criteria for “fairness”. If prevalence P (Y ) differs across
groups (and assuming a fallible, non-trivial predictor), equalizing one set of measures across groups ensures
that some measures in both other sets will differ across groups. Furthermore, equalizing the first two measures
in either set 1 or 2 ensures that all measures in both other groups will differ across groups.
5 Discussion
Since several intuitive measures of fairness are mutu-
ally exclusive (when populations differ in prevalence
and the predictor is neither perfect nor trivial), it fol-
lows that any predictor can always be portrayed as
biased or unfair, by choosing a specific measure of
fairness. Note that this result applies to all forms of
prediction, whether performed by algorithms or by
humans.
Given the mathematical impossibility of simulta-
neously fulfilling all the measures of “fairness” de-
scribed above, how can a predictor adjust their be-
havior? There are multiple options, which are not
mutually exclusive.
5.1 Choose one measure and stick to
it
These various measures tend to emphasize different
viewpoints and perspectives about fairness, and de-
pending on the situation, it is possible that one mea-
sure could be legitimately preferred to others.
Measure 3 suggests that the predictor should be
equally “harsh” across groups, ensuring that the pro-
portion of positive predictions to actual events is sim-
ilar (ideally, equal to one). This is a highly intuitive
notion of fairness at the level of the group.
The second criterion may be seen as reflecting the
judge’s viewpoint: “given the output of the test, what
is the chance that the event actually occurs?” Sim-
ilarly, the first criterion seems to reflect the defen-
dant’s viewpoint: “Given that I am actually innocent
(or not), what is the chance that the algorithm will
flag me?”
We note that this last measure, in particular, seems
to be of special interest. The so-called Blackstone for-
mulation: “It is better that ten guilty persons escape
than that one innocent suffer” can be interpreted
as emphasizing P (Pred/¬Y ) as the most important
measure. It is also the basis for Hardt’s equalized
odds criterion [4] (which in the binary case is exactly
identical to our Measure 1).
Alternative: Mix and match measures to
equalize across criteria
The above results leave open the possibility of equal-
izing some individual quantities within each criterion,
at the expense of making others differ. For example,
it would be feasible to equalize calibration/severity,
at the same time as precision (=positive predictive
value) and true positive rate (=sensitivity or recall).
This would be at the expense of differing false pos-
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itive rates (=fallout, false alarm rate) and negative
predictive value.
5.2 Improve the test as much as pos-
sible
As stated in the introduction, a perfect classi-
fier would simultaneously equalize all these mea-
sures across groups. Inspection of the proofs re-
veals that the dependence of these measures on
actual prevalence results from terms of the form
P (Pred/¬Y )P (¬Y )
P (Y ) - i.e. an error term multiplied by
a strictly monotonic function of the prevalence. If the
error terms (P (Pred/¬Y ), P (Y/¬Pred), etc.) can
be reduced as much as possible, the discrepancy be-
tween the various measures will also decrease. Thus,
improving the accuracy of the predictors will tend to
improve the compatibility between various measures
of fairness.
5.3 Ignore these measures and reach
for a first-principles solution
Ideally, a fair predictor would effectively eliminate
group membership as an independent influence on
decisions. As a theoretical example, one may con-
sider a multiple-regression approach, in which a re-
gressor for group membership is used while training
the predictor, then discarded at decision time (this
is a purely theoretical example; we do not claim that
such a method is actually feasible or desirable in prac-
tice). Under some conditions, a method of this kind
would guarantee that group membership does not af-
fect conclusions even if other variables correlate with
group membership.
However, such a measure would likely lead to worse
predictions (because group membership may itself be
a proxy for other predictive variables not included in
the model). In addition, it also fail some or all of the
measures of fairness described above, and thus would
still be open to claims of bias.
5.4 Use a detailed cost-benefit ap-
proach
In some circumstances, the costs of the various types
of errors (false alarms, misses, etc.) can be quan-
tified. In this case, assuming sufficient and reliable
data, the objective optimum for each quantity can
be effectively computed. Such cost-benefits analyses
are particularly relevant in the medical domain, as
illustrated by the output of the British National In-
stitute for Health and Care Excellence. However, in
other circumstances, the costs and benefits are either
difficult to assess, or lie in a moral plane that is not
amenable to quantification.
To conclude, we stress that the foregoing should in
now way distract from the important goal of disman-
tling the very real biases and discriminations that
affect existing decision mechanisms. To spell out the
obvious: just because any decision system will math-
ematically be “biased” along some measure, does not
at all imply that any observed bias is simply a math-
ematical artifact. Thus, the incompatibility between
fairness measures should not be used as a cover for
obvious injustices. On the contrary, a better under-
standing of logical constraints on the outcomes of de-
cision systems can and should inform, and therefore
assist, efforts toward a fairer world.
References
[1] Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lau-
ren Kirchner. Machine bias: Theres software used
across the country to predict future criminals. and
its biased against blacks. ProPublica, 2016.
[2] Tim Brennan, William Dieterich, and Beate
Ehret. Evaluating the predictive validity of the
compas risk and needs assessment system. Crim-
inal Justice and Behavior, 36(1):21–40, 2009.
[3] Alexandra Chouldechova. Fair prediction with
disparate impact: A study of bias in recidi-
vism prediction instruments. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1703.00056, 2017.
[4] Moritz Hardt, Eric Price, Nati Srebro, et al.
Equality of opportunity in supervised learning. In
5
Advances in Neural Information Processing Sys-
tems, pages 3315–3323, 2016.
[5] Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Man-
ish Raghavan. Inherent trade-offs in the fair
determination of risk scores. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1609.05807, 2016.
6
